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Abstract UK environmental law has been heavily influenced by EU membership,
and Brexit presents both opportunities and challenges to its long-term development.
In the immediate future the substance of much of existing EU environmental law will
continue to have legal effect in the UK after Brexit under the Government’s policy
of ‘roll-over’. But it has become increasingly clear that other features of the EU
environmental architecture will need to be replicated after Brexit—notably the role of
general environmental principles, and the European Commission’s supervisory role
in ensuring that environmental law is properly applied by government.
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1 The influence of EU environmental law in the UK
At the time of writing, the outcome of the United Kingdom’s BREXIT arrangements
remains uncertain. Nevertheless, whatever the precise details of any agreement (or
even lack of agreement) it is possible to predict at least some of the immediate im-
pacts of Brexit on UK environmental law. In common with many EU Member States,
national law and policy has been heavily influenced by the environmental legislation
of the European Union over the past thirty years or so. EU membership has affected
not simply the substance of UK environment law, but has brought profound changes
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to the style and character of its legislation.1 The UK has a long history of environ-
mental law and regulation stretching back to the industrial revolution in the nineteenth
century, but prior to membership of the EU, national environmental legislation was
typically very detailed in procedural requirements (the need to obtain licenses for
specified activities etc.) but frequently was silent as to policy goals which were left to
government to determine. Similarly, the details of emissions standards and similar re-
quirements were often left to the discretion of regulatory bodies to determine within
the broad framework of environmental legislation, or in accordance with policy guid-
ance set by government. The need to implement EU environmental legislation has
substantially changed these long-standing characteristics of UK environmental law.
Precise emission standards, detailed environmental quality objectives, and target obli-
gations derived from EU law now permeate national law. A good example concerns
drinking water standards. For many years, the standard in national legislation was
simply one of supplying ‘wholesome water’.2 In practice, public bodies supplying
water often used World Health Organization and international similar standards to
flesh out this flexible legal phrase. But legislation since 1980, implementing the EC
Drinking Water Directive,3 now contains a set of precise standards within the body
of the law and reflecting those in the Directive.4 These characteristics are now so
entrenched in the body of environmental law that, whatever changes take place in the
longer term as a result of Brexit, it is unlikely that there will ever be a substantive
return to the pre-EU style of legislation.
2 The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018
2.1 The roll-over of EU environmental law
Whatever form that Brexit takes, much of the substantive detail of environmental law
will not change immediately. The Government policy has been that in the interests
of regulatory certainty EU legislation should be ‘rolled-over’ as far as possible after
Brexit. As the Government White Paper in 2017 stated, ‘The Great Repeal Bill will
ensure that the whole body of existing EU environmental law continues to have effect
in UK law. This will provide businesses and stakeholders with maximum certainty as
we leave the EU’.5 The legal mechanisms for doing so are provided in the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 which introduces the concept of ‘retained EU law’.
Essentially any EU Regulation or EU decision addressed to the UK which was op-
erative before the date of exit from the EU will continue to form part of domestic
law. Similarly, ‘EU derived domestic legislation’ that implements EU Directives will
continue in force. Furthermore, the principle of supremacy of EU law will continue
1Macrory [10].
2S 115 Public Health Act 1936.
3Now Directive 98/83/EC of the Council of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for human
consumption [1998] OJ L 330/32.
4For current standards see Water Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2016/614.
5Department for Exiting the European Union [2], p. 17.
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to apply to legislation made before the date of exit.6 EU environment Regulations
made before exit day will therefore continue to override pre-existing national law
if there is a conflict. But this principle of supremacy does not apply to legislation
made after exit from the EU7 giving the freedom for Government and Parliament
to change legislation in future, though subject to any constraints that may be con-
tained in any agreement reached between the UK and the EU. As for the longer term
future, the Government White Paper in 2017 noted that, after Brexit, ‘We will then
have the opportunity over time, to ensure our legislative framework is outcome driven
and delivers on our overall commitment to improve the environment within a gener-
ation.’8
Directives themselves will have no independent legal status post Brexit since it is
the implementing national legislation that continues to have effect. This could cre-
ate problems where the national legislation has not correctly transposed a particular
Directive—there will be no general duty on the courts to interpret such legislation
in accordance with the Directive, and unless there has been a specific case prior exit
date in either the Court of Justice of the European Union or the national courts on
the issue, the ‘direct effect’ doctrine of directives will cease to apply: the European
Union (Withdrawal) Act provides that rights arising under an EU Directive do not
continue after Brexit unless ‘of a kind recognised by the European Court or any court
or tribunal in the United Kingdom in a case decided before exit day (whether or not
as an essential part of the decision in the case).’9
2.2 Adjustment of roll-over EU law
Many EU environmental regulations and national law implementing directives will
therefore continue to have legal force immediately following the UK’s exit from the
EU. But there are clearly some examples where the substantive law is so intimately
bound into EU institutional arrangements that simple roll-over is not possible unless
specific agreements with the EU are made. Good examples are the EU emissions trad-
ing regime for greenhouse gases,10 and the EU Regulation of chemicals (REACH).11
A good deal of national environmental legislation now contains cross references to
EU law. For example, the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regula-
tions 2016 defines a waste battery as having ‘the meaning given in Article 3(7) of the
Batteries Directive, but do not include any waste which is excluded from the scope
6S 5(2) European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
7S 5(1) European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
8Department for Exiting the European Union [3], p. 17.
9S 4(2) European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
10Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing
a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 275/32. In March 2018, the Minister for Energy and Clean Growth told
Parliament that it was the UK Government’s intention to stay within the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
until the end of Phase 3 in 2020.
11Regulation 1907/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 con-
cerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) [2006] OJ L
396/1.
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of that Directive by Article 2(2)’.12 Even though the Directive will have no indepen-
dent legal force in the United Kingdom after Brexit, there seems no reason why such
definitional references cannot continue—it would be similar to having a reference in
legislation to a definition in an OECD or similar international document. In contrast,
some EU Regulations and national legislation implementing containing references to
the requirement to notify or consult the European Commission, and clearly these can
no longer apply after Brexit and another body, such as the Secretary of State, will
need to be substituted.
It is therefore clear that in order to ensure that retained EU law remains oper-
able, there is a considerable task of detailed amendments that will be necessary,
even if the core substantive obligations remain. In September 2017, the Secretary of
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs told Parliamentarians that there were
around 850 pieces of legislation within his Department’s responsibility that would
require amendment.13 Most of these concern animal and plant health and agricul-
ture, with about a quarter in the environmental field. The issue will cover all areas
of national law affected by EU legislation, and to allow for this scale of amendments
to be made in the time-scales required and without overloading Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 has given government broad powers to make
regulations considered ‘appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate—(a) any failure
of retained EU law to operate effectively, or (b) any other deficiency in retained EU
law, arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU.’14 The term
‘Deficiencies’ is further defined to include, inter alia, ‘retained EU law that contains
anything which has no practical application in relation to the United Kingdom or
any part of it or is otherwise redundant or substantially redundant’. The scope of
the discretion caused some concern during the passage of the Act through Parlia-
ment, but it is important to note that the legislation provides any such failures or
deficiencies must arise out of Brexit. A government that was, for example, unhappy
with the strict requirements of the Habitats Directive15 could not use these powers
to amend the implementing regulations since they would not be ‘deficient’ in those
terms.
There was a further concern in Parliament during the passage of the Act about
the extent of these regulatory powers. Many of the references to EU law or institu-
tions are contained in detailed national regulations, but primary legislation—Acts of
Parliament—sometimes contains EU references, and will also require to be amended
post-Brexit if the law is to remain operable. Generally, the legislative practice is that
an Act of Parliament can only be amended by another Act of Parliament, but it was
felt there would simply not be sufficient Parliamentary time to secure amendments
in this way. Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act therefore allows the
regulations to amend Acts of Parliament as well as other regulations, a device known
12Environmental Permitting Regulations 2016, reg 2.
13Letter from the Secretary of State to Chair, House of Commons Select Committee on Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs. This figure does to include EU environmental legislation that falls within the remit of
other departments, and the total will therefore be higher.
14S 8(1)European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
15Directive 92/43/EEC of the Council of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild
fauna and flora [1992] OJ L 206/7.
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as a ‘Henry VIII’ clause.16 There have been previous examples of such powers being
given by legislation, but they have usually been fairly limited in their scope. Here the
potential reach of such powers is much broader, giving rise to the political concern.
However, a recent study of existing Acts of Parliament concerning the environment
indicated that references to EU law or institutions was more limited that might have
been thought (in contrast to environmental regulations)—out of twenty-nine environ-
mental Acts, seventeen required no amendment, and in the remainder six changes
were necessary while a further thirty would be advisable.17
2.3 Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 also deals with the legal status of de-
cisions of the CJEU. Decisions made by the CJEU after the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU will no longer bind the UK courts, nor will courts have any power to make
references to the CJEU. In practice, the national courts are likely to have regard to
post-Brexit decisions of the CJEU where, say, it is interpreting a term that appears
in retained EU law, but they will not be bound to follow them. As for existing deci-
sions of the court, the Act introduces a neat balance designed to maintain a degree of
regulatory certainty but allowing some flexibility. The lower courts will continue to
be bound by decisions made by the CJEU prior to Brexit, but the highest court, the
Supreme Court, will have the discretion to depart from such decisions. But the Act
states that it should only do so in line with its own practice of rarely departing from
its own previous decisions.18 To take a recent example, in People over Wind and
Sweetman v Collite,19 the CJEU held that mitigation measures could not be taken
into account when assessing whether a project was likely to have significant environ-
mental effects under the Habitats Directive. This decision was contrary to previous
decisions on the same point taken by the British High Court and Court of Appeal. Post
Brexit, this decision will continue to bind the lower courts dealing with the national
Habitats regulations,20 but if the issue ever reached the Supreme Court it could de-
cide not the follow the ruling of the CJEU. Alternatively, the government post Brexit
would have the power to amend the legislation should they wish, subject to the con-
straints that may be contained in any withdrawal agreement made between the EU
and UK.
16Named after extensive powers to given to Henry VIII (1509–1547) under the Statute of Proclamations
1539.
17UK Environmental Law Association [14].
18In 1966 the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, the predecessor to the Supreme Court, stressed
the importance of binding precedent providing certainly in law but for the first time indicated that too rigid
adherence to precedent could lead to injustice and that in future, while it would normally treat its previous
decisions as binding, it would be prepared to depart from them ‘when it appears right to do so’: House
of Lords Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234. In 2010, the Supreme Court held
that this Statement was still applicable to the Supreme Court: Austin (FC) v London Borough of Southwark
[2010] UKSC 28.
19Case C-323/17 Sweetman, EU:C:2018:244.
20Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017/1012.
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3 Environmental principles
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act provides that retained EU law is to be inter-
preted in accordance with ‘retained general principles of EU law’, provided it was
recognised as a general principle by the CJEU before the date of departure from EU.
However, the Act excludes any rights to claim damages under the rule in Frankovitch
after exit, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is expressly declared not to be part
of domestic law once the UK leaves the EU. The environmental principles contain in
Art. 191 TFEU are not considered to be general principles, and their role and status
post Brexit has given rise to considerable political debate during the passage of the
European Union (Withdrawal) Act in Parliament. The environmental principles are
often mentioned in the preambles of Directives, but it is generally only the substantive
provisions of directives, rather than the preambles, that are transposed into domestic
law. This did not mean that the environmental principles would have been totally ex-
cluded from domestic law post Brexit. First, EU Regulations will continue to have
force as retained EU law, and this appears to include their preambles. Secondly, de-
cisions of the CJEU prior to Brexit and applying the environmental principles to the
interpretation of EU environmental law will continue to bind the lower national courts
in accordance with the provisions of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act described
in Sect. 2.3 above.
General environmental principles have rarely formed part of UK national environ-
mental law, and in the absence of a clear steer from the CJEU, it is rare for the EU
environmental principles to be a determining factor in national judicial review cases
challenging the legality of decisions taken by government or other public bodies.21
Nevertheless, there are examples of environmental principles such as the precaution-
ary principle, being used by government inspectors determining appeals in areas such
as water abstraction licences as a means of resolving complex and competing scien-
tific evidence.22
The Government recognised that environmental principles could play a useful role
post-Brexit and in May 2018 launched a consultation document on the possible role
of environmental principles after Brexit.23 As the document stated, ‘We believe it will
be beneficial to underpin environmental regulation and policy-making with a clear set
of principles.’24 But the consultation document deliberately left open for discussion
a number of broad questions—in particular what environmental principles should
be included? Should they be expressed in legislation, or should they be contained
in a Policy Statement explaining how they should be interpreted and applied? The
consultation did not end until August 2018, but to a certain extent these open ques-
tions were overtaken by political events. During the passage of the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act, the House of Lords passed an amendment, initiated by environ-
mental NGOs, designed to incorporate the EU principles into UK law post-Brexit.
The Government recognised that the issue now had considerable political support,
21Macrory and Thornton [9].
22Ibid., p. 910.
23Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs [1].
24Ibid., para. 4.
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and proposed a counter-amendment which was passed by the House of Commons.25
This now provides that a set of environmental principles must be contained in legis-
lation, but gives the Government rather more discretion in the legal role that they will
play in future.
Section 16 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act requires the Secretary of State
to publish an environmental Bill within six months from the date the Act came into
force (26 June 2018). This bill must contain a set of principles consisting of:
(a) the precautionary principle so far as relating to the environment,
(b) the principle of preventative action to avert environmental damage,
(c) the principle that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source,
(d) the polluter pays principle,
(e) the principle of sustainable development,
(f) the principle that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into
the definition and implementation of policies and activities,
(g) public access to environmental information,
(h) public participation in environmental decision-making, and
(i) access to justice in relation to environmental matters.
Other principles could be added26 and many interest groups have suggested additional
principles such as the non-regression principle.
As to the status of these principles, section 16 goes on to provide that the new Bill
to be produced by Government must impose a duty on the Secretary of State to pro-
duce a policy statement in relation to the application and interpretation of these prin-
ciples in connection with the making of policy by Government, and a duty to ensure
that Government ministers ‘must have regard to’ these principles in circumstances
provided for under the Bill. Clearly this still leaves considerable leeway for the Gov-
ernment, and it is likely that there will be pressure in Parliament during the passage
of this new Bill during 2019 to strengthen these requirements. For example, many
environmental NGOs argue that they should apply beyond central Government but to
all public bodies making environmental decisions. Similarly, there will be pressure to
strengthen the wording, ‘have regard to’, (which legally implies that while they must
always be considered they can be ignored in any particular circumstance) to a duty to
apply these principles in all decision-making.
4 A new enforcement body
One of the functions of the European Commission is to ensure that Member States
properly implement their EU obligations, and Art. 258 of the TFEU gives the Com-
mission a distinctive set of enforcement procerus which can eventually lead to action
before the CJEU. These enforcement powers have been applied in all areas of EU law
25Where the House of Lords passes amendments to Government proposed legislation with which the
House of Commons disagrees, the proposed legislation may go back and forth many times between the
Lords and the Commons until agreement is reached—known as ‘ping pong’. In this case, the House of
Lords, while noting that the Commons amendment on environmental principles did not go as far as they
wished, withdraw its own amendment.
26S 16(e) allows the inclusion in the Bill of ‘other provisions as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.’
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but the Commission has long been especially active in the environmental field—in
2015 the highest number of infringement proceedings concerned EU environmental
law.27 There are reasons for this. In many fields of EU law such as employment, in-
tellectual property and completion law, there are clear legal and economic interests
who can be expected to ensure that their rights under EU law are properly protected.
There is generally no equivalence of rights and private interests in the environment.
Governments and public bodies in most jurisdictions have therefore been given dis-
tinctive responsibilities under national law for ensuring environmental protection, but
it is often these bodies who are often faced with conflicting policy priorities and fi-
nancial constraints, making the environment especially vulnerable. Environmental
NGOs and other interest groups do of course play an important role in helping to
ensure compliance with environmental law but cannot be expected to shoulder all the
responsibilities for so doing.
Part of the Commission’s supervisory role is to ensure that EU Directives are prop-
erly transposed into national law, but equally a breach of environmental law by a
Member State in practice is considered a failure of its EU responsibilities. In this
context, actions can be taken not just in respect of central government but any failing
by an emanation of the state such as a local authority and a national environmental
agency can also be considered a failing by the Member State concerned. In dealing
with breaches in practice, the Commission does not have its own inspectorate within
Members States, but has a developed a citizens’ complaint procedure allowing any-
one at no cost to alert it of possible breaches. This can then trigger the Commission to
seek further information from the Member State concerned, and leading to possible
infringement proceedings.
Much of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is concerned with the ‘roll-
over’ of substantive EU law, but after Brexit, the European Commission will no
longer have a supervisory role under Art. 258 TFEU. When this governance gap
was pointed out to government by parliamentarians in 2017,28 the initial response
of the then Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs was that ex-
isting judicial review procedures were adequate to ensure the legal accountability of
government and other public bodies. It is true that the national courts have generally
adopted a very liberal approach to questions of standing in environmental judicial
reviews, with the result that almost any environmental organisation or concerned cit-
izen will be permitted to bring a claim. But judicial reviews in the UK take place
in the High Court and are resource intensive, and normally involve legal represen-
tation. Generally, the side that loses must pay the winning side’s legal costs, and
although, as a result of the Aarhus Convention, there are now statutory upper limits
of the exposure to adverse costs orders,29 the financial resources and risks involved
27European Commission [4].
28See, for example, House of Lords [8]: ‘The evidence we have heard strongly suggests that an effective
and independent domestic enforcement mechanism will be necessary, in order to fill the vacuum left by
the European Commission in ensuring the compliance of the Government and public authorities with
environmental obligations. Such enforcement will need to be underpinned by effective judicial oversight,
and we note the concerns of witnesses that existing domestic judicial review procedures may be inadequate
and costly.’ (para. 84).
29Under the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 45, in an Aarhus claim, a losing claimant may not generally be
order to pay costs of the other side of more than £5000 (where the claimant is an individual) or £10000
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in judicial review remain considerable. Perhaps more importantly, it is clear that the
European Commission attempts as far as possible to resolve infringement proceed-
ings by negotiation and discussion—a very small proportion of cases ever reach the
CJEU. Judicial review procedures, in contrast, are ill-suited to resolving issues in this
way—once legal action is started it is rare for a case to settle before the court hearing,
unless the weakness of one side’s case becomes obvious.
In July 2017, a new Secretary of State was appointed, Michael Gove, one of the
leading Brexiteers. He clearly wanted to make a distinctive mark with a vision of a
powerful environmental policy post Brexit, and he immediately recognised that post
Brexit judicial review was not sufficient in itself to hold government to account, but
that some new national independent body would be needed. Other examples of sim-
ilar bodies exist in the United Kingdom such as the Equality and Humans Rights
Commission, established under the Equality Act 2006 with responsibility for the pro-
motion and enforcement of equality and non-discrimination laws. Its powers include
to carrying out of investigations, and the powers to serve compliance notices against
both the private sector and governmental bodies. The 2018 Consultation Paper on en-
vironmental principles also discussed the need for a new national body to replace
the supervisory role of the European Commission. But the idea had appeared to
cause concern in other Departments and the Consultation Paper proposed the new
body would have only powers to serve advisory notices on government rather than
any further legal enforcement powers. Once again, during the parliamentary passage
of the European (Union) Withdrawal Act, the House of Lords passed amendments
to strengthen its powers. The compromise amendment accepted by government ac-
knowledge that its powers must go beyond mere advice, and section 16 now requires
the government to establish a new public authority with functions ‘proportionate en-
forcement action (including legal proceedings if necessary) where the authority con-
siders that a Minister of the Crown is not complying with environmental law.’30
A number of important issues remain to be determined. First, as drafted, the pro-
vision only concerns breaches of environmental law by Ministers of the Crown (i.e.
Central Government). It is clear that breaches by other public bodies should be within
the jurisdiction of the new body. The simplest way of doing so would be to extend
its powers and allow it to take enforcement action directly against local government
and other public bodies as well as central government. An alternative model, which
would more closely replicate the current enforcement role of the Commission, would
allow the new body only to take action against central government but in respect of
any breaches of law by any public body—an extended notion of responsibility which
would be novel in conventional public law terms. But as the response of the UK En-
vironmental Law Association put it, ‘this approach ensures that Central Government
cannot duck its responsibility to take steps to address the breach of environmental
law by arguing that this is a matter for local government or some other public body.
It would have to provide a convincing response to show that it is addressing the issue
or default’.31 It is very unlikely that the new body will investigate and take action
(where the claimant is a company or organisation). A winning claimant may not normally be able to claim
for than £35000 in legal costs.
30S 16(d) European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
31UK Environmental Law Association [13].
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in respect of all environmental law breaches, but will be selective and strategic in its
approach, only bringing action in the most serious cases. In those circumstances, it is
not unreasonable that it should be central government that must sort out the problem,
even if it was not the immediate cause of the breach.
The new body will undoubtedly try to resolve issues without the need for formal
legal proceedings in much the way that the Commission does at present. But where
proceedings are taken, another important issue to be determined is the power of the
courts. Failure to comply with a judgment of the CJEU can lead to substantial finan-
cial penalties being imposed by the court under Art. 259 TFEU. In the environmental
field, such penalties have been imposed on a number of Member States since 2000,
and although the United Kingdom has yet to receive a penalty, the existence of such
powers have undoubtedly focussed the minds of government. If one were to replicate
the EU procedures in a national context, the new body would have power to serve a
compliance notice. If this is confirmed by a court, and still not complied with by gov-
ernment, then the new body could seek a financial penalty from the court. But where
central government was involved, some method of ring-fencing the penalty would be
needed, otherwise it would simply be recycled with government. Others have argued
that such explicit powers of penalty are not required, unless for totemic or political
reasons. The failure of a government or other public body to comply with the judg-
ments of a court in judicial review actions in any event is a contempt of court, and the
courts have inherent powers to fine, sequester, in even imprison those responsible. In
practice, it is very rare for a government or public body to fail to comply with a clear
order of a court. Until the terms of the new Environment Bill are clear (probably end
of 2018 or early 2019), the Government’s view on these issues will not be known.
Finally, the proposed new body currently concerns England only. Environmental
matters are now generally devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and
in the absence of any specific agreement on these matters between the UK and the
EU, central government does not have the legal powers to impose such a body on
the devolved administrations. In an ideal world, the devolved governments would
recognise the value of such a body having jurisdiction across the UK, or at the least
the need to establish equivalent bodies in all the jurisdiction. But there continue to be
tensions (especially between the UK government and Scotland) and it may well be
that separate bodies are established in the different jurisdictions.32
5 The UK and European environmental co-operation bodies post Brexit
Over the last thirty years or so, a whole range of cooperation bodies and official net-
works have developed in Europe. Some, such as the European Environment Agency
(EEA) and the European Chemical Agency, have been established under EU legis-
lation. Others, such as the European Union Forum for Judge for the Environment
32See for example, Scottish Roundtable on Environment and Climate Change [11]. The report notes that,
‘having a Scottish body with a thorough understanding of Scottish law, procedures and systems would be
more focused on the issues that are most significant in a Scottish context. Scotland is of a scale at which
we can envisage a separate body being justifiable and effective. However, we suggest that consideration be
given to how arrangements might best work across the UK to allow collaboration, comparisons, efficient
use of expertise and promotion of best practice.’ (para. 5.16).
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and the European Network of Prosecutors for the Environment, have grown indepen-
dently as officials and other bodies have found the value in sharing information and
best practice. A recent report identified thirteen such bodies established under EU
law, and five with their own constitution and rules of membership.33
There are a number of questions concerning the relationship of the UK with such
bodies after Brexit. First, as a non-member-state, do the relevant rules permit the
United Kingdom to remain a member? For example, non-EU countries can be a
member of the European Environment Agency.34 There would be considerable ben-
efits for the UK to remain a member of the EEA but under the present Regulation
this would require an agreement to be reached between the EU and the UK, and the
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the CJEU concerning contractual and other liabil-
ities of the Agency. In contrast, the rules establishing the European IPPC Bureau
allow membership of only Member States, and international organisations represent-
ing industries and non-governmental organisations.35 The current constitution of the
European Union Forum for Judges for the Environment allows membership only of
judges of the CJEU, the European Court of Human Rights, and judges of an EU or
EFTA Member State.
The second question is whether it is in the interests of the UK to continue to
interact with such bodies post Brexit. If it is, and current membership rules do not
permit membership by non-EU countries, the UK could seek to secure amendment to
the relevant rules, or some form of observer status through collateral agreements. The
Government has yet to articulate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the whole
range of existing environmental co-operation bodies, but in its White Paper in July
2018 stated that its vision for an economic partnership with the EU ‘would include
participation by the UK in those EU agencies that provide authorisations for goods
in highly regulated sectors—namely the European Chemicals Agency, the European
Aviation Safety Agency, and the European Medicines Agency—accepting the rules of
these agencies and contributing to their costs, under new arrangements that recognise
the UK will not be a Member State’.36
6 International environmental law post Brexit
The UK has ratified over forty international environmental treaties, and Government
has several times stated that it remains committed to its international obligations post
33UK Environmental Law Association [12].
34Art. 19 of Regulation 2009/401 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on
the European Environment Agency and the European Environment Information and Observation Network
[2019] OJ L 126/13 provides that ‘The Agency is open to countries which are not members of the Com-
munity but which share the concern of the Community and the Member States for the objectives of the
Agency under agreements concluded between them and the Community following the procedure in Article
300 of the Treaty’.
35Decision 2011/C 146/03 of the Commission establishing a forum for the exchange of information pur-
suant to Article 13 of the Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions [2011] OJ C 146/3 allows EEA
members such as Norway to attend meetings of the forum.
36HM Government [4], p. 8.
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Brexit. But leaving the EU does raise some legal issues as to the extent of these
obligations, because the EU has participated in many of these treaties. There are
some such as the International Whaling Convention 1946 where the EU had no legal
competence and the UK has ratified on its own. These obligations clearly continue
after Brexit. On the other hand, there are areas, notably in fishing, where the EU has
had exclusive competence to ratifying, binding the Member States in so doing. Here
the UK will no longer be bound by these agreements unless it makes a conscious
decision to ratify.
But the vast majority of international environmental conventions are so called
mixed agreements where both the EU and Member States have ratified because their
competence straddle the subject matter of the Convention in question. Here the le-
gal position is not entirely certain. Some have argued that after Brexit these will no
longer bind the UK unless, as with exclusive agreements, it decides to ratify in its
own right.37 An alternative and probably more convincing analysis is that on Brexit
the UK assumes all the competences formally held by the EU and is automatically
bound by the full extent of these mixed international agreements. Simple notification
to the relevant secretariat that it has assumed all the responsibilities is all that is re-
quired. The UK Government’s view of the legal position of mixed agreements is not
yet known.
But assuming that the UK does continue to be bound by all the international envi-
ronmental agreements which it has ratified, this does not mean that the legal situation
remains the same after Brexit. Many international agreements have been implemented
by EU Directives and Regulations, and it is these instruments which have had direct
legal force within the national system. Some of these have fleshed out requirements
of the international convention or extended their ambit within the EU. A good exam-
ple is the regulation on transfrontier shipments of waste38 implementing the Basel
Convention.39 The Basel Convention is confined to hazardous waste whereas the EU
regulation covers both hazardous and non-hazardous waste. In the immediate post-
Brexit period, the EU regulation will be ‘rolled-over’ into UK law, but in the future
government could decides to amend the national law and confined itself solely to the
requirements of the Convention in question.
Furthermore, the UK legal system has long operated a ‘dualist system’ in rela-
tion to international law, meaning that the national courts will not give direct legal
force to the obligations in a convention unless they have been transposed into na-
tional law. In contrast to obligations under EU Directives, there is no constitutional
or legal requirement on the UK to ensure that international environmental obligations
are reflected in national law, and there are examples where mere statements of pol-
icy have been employed to reflect international obligations. It is true that in recent
years the UK courts have frequently referred to international conventions to assist
them in the interpretation of national law, but the fact remains that international law
37Van de Loo and Blocksman [5]; the authors argue that a protocol would be needed for each agreement
agreed by the EU27 and other third country parties to the agreement.
38Regulation 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on shipments of
waste [2006] OJ L 190/1.
39Basel Convention of 22 March 1989 on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes
and their disposal, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1673, p. 57.
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does not have the same direct legal impact within the national context as does EU
law. In many areas of the environment this has not been a significant issue since the
international obligations have been operating, as it were, in the shadow of the more
immediate implementing EU law. But in the future we can expect more attention to be
given to international environmental in post Brexit UK. Aside from any provisions in
any agreement reached with the EU, the international conventions which the UK has
ratified will, post Brexit, form the main legal constraint on the freedom of the gov-
ernment to depart from current environmental norms. Whether this will embolden the
national courts to give more weight to international law in purely national litigation
remains to be seen.40
7 Conclusions
The Government’s initial position on EU environmental law post Brexit has been
that its requirements will initially be rolled over as far as possible into national law
in order to provide legal stability and certainty. It is a technically complex task but
achievably in most areas. Even decisions of the CJEU before Brexit will continue to
bind the lower courts after the UK leaves the EU. ‘Roll-over’, however, is essentially
concerned with the black letter of substantive law, and during the last two years it has
become increasingly clear that there are significant aspects of the existing architecture
of EU environmental law which are not dealt with by roll-over, and unless steps are
taken would disappear after Brexit. Two notable examples are the role of EU environ-
mental principles, and the supervisory role of the European Commission in ensuring
that Member States comply with their EU obligations. To its credit, the Government
has acknowledged the importance of replicating these features in national environ-
mental post-Brexit, though the precise details as to how this will be done are not
yet known. Similarly, the UK has been a participant in many European bodies and
networks concerning the environment, both formal and less formal, and the extent to
which it will continue to do so and on what basis remains a challenge. Finally, the
UK has long been an active supporter of international environmental conventions,
and remains committed to continue to do so in the future. The precise extent of its
international obligations post Brexit where the EU has participated in such agree-
ments still remains a little unclear. But it seems likely that post Brexit international
environmental law will assume both greater political and legal significance.
On the political side, there is a degree of irony that one of the leading Brexiteers
was appointed Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in July
2017, and to the surprise of many environmental organisations has since pursued a
bold and radical approach to environmental policy and law. A new 25 plan to improve
the environment was published in January 2018 setting out ambitious proposals for
40In a recent decision of the Supreme Court concerning discrimination law, one of the judges suggested
that where the UK had signed an international convention concerning human rights which had not been
implemented into national law, the strict dualist approach should be ignored, and the Government be held
bound by its international obligations by the national courts. He was in the minority, but this could be
a pointer to the future. See R (on the application of SG and others) v Secretary of State for Works and
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16.
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the longer term post-Brexit.41 A month later, the Secretary of State launched a bold
consultation paper to reform agricultural policy, ensuring that subsidies post Brexit
went only for environmental and other land improvements.42 There is little doubt
that is some areas such as agriculture and fisheries, a national government could im-
plement more radical and environmentally sensitive policies quicker and more effec-
tively than is possible within the EU. But this is dependent on national political lead-
ership, and changes in government or even a move of ministers could equally lead to
a lowering of environmental priorities, especially in the light of economic challenges
post Brexit. The constraint of EU environmental law has to date provided a minimum
set of legal standards to which all Member States are bound, and this legal bedrock
will disappear after Brexit. Hence the importance of the terms of any agreement
reached between the UK and the EU on Brexit concerning the maintenance of existing
environmental standards. In the absence of such an agreement, international environ-
mental law will assume far greater significance than has hitherto been the case. Brexit
involves many uncharted legal waters. The extent to which it provides opportunities
for the UK to enhance or degrade its environmental law remains to be seen.
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